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FRANcIs D. MuRNAGHAN, JR.*
As my colleague Judge H. Emory Widener, Jr. observed in his Fourth
Circuit Review Foreword of 1980, and as Judge James Dickson Phillips, Jr.
reemphasized in his Foreword of 1982, the annual increase in filings has become
an identifying symbol for the calendar of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. When considered in the abstract, the statistics would
inspire little optimism on the part of one concerned about prompt resolution
of appeals. Indeed, confronted with numbers reflecting a constant increase
in the already full circuit docket, even the heartiest among us would pause
to query precisely how that increase could be absorbed.
As of the circuit year ending June 30, 1983, there had been an overall
increase in filings of 6.4 percent above the 1982 level. With district courts
experiencing a 13.3 percent increase in civil filings alone for the twelve-month
period ended September 30, 1983,' our derivative increase was to be expected.
The number of cases pending on appeal as of June 30, 1983, including
miscellaneous cases, stood at 1,850. Private civil cases constituted over 29 per-
cent of that number, with criminal matters and prisoner petitions representing
about 21 percent each. Other United States civil, bankruptcy, original pro-
ceedings, and administrative appeals represented the balance of the caseload.
While the total number is admittedly substantial, it does not represent any
dramatic change from backlogs of previous years. Thus, we proceed at a
deliberate, though not indifferent, pace through the calendar, approaching
the task with a blind eye to the difficulty presented by statistics alone. Like
the bumblebee that could not levitate were it apprised of the laws of
aerodynamics thought to make its flight impossible, so too do we approach
our task. We appear to cope.
The loss of Judge Albert V. Bryan marks a dark spot in the circuit's year,
and we will miss his personal warmth and assistance. On a more positive note,
it seems appropriate to observe that the efficient completion of our task over
the past year has been due in no small measure to the continued and active
presence of Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. on the bench. Though he took qualified
retirement effective November 1, 1982, in choosing to sit, Judge Butzner con-
tinues in the tradition of Judges Haynsworth and Field (to mention only those
still with us), providing much needed and appreciated assistance in disposi-
tion of the caseload. In an era that has seen the splitting of the Fifth Circuit,
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. Federal Judicial Workload Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
as reported in the Fourth Circuit Newsletter (January, 1984).
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and has admitted of rumblings of a splitting of the Ninth Circuit, the con-
tinued and collegial unity of this circuit emerges as a substantial aid to the
fulfillment of the business of the court.
Of particular importance over the past year regarding management of the
circuit's calendar has been the matter of transcript delay. Such delay not only
contributes to the backlog facing the circuit, but also, and more importantly,
causes increased aggravation and anxiety for parties eager to press their claims
to appellate resolution. Although the problem is particularly pronounced in
the District of Maryland, it is a recurring one throughout the circuit. The
case of United States v. Johnson,2 argued in January 1984, presents a typical
instance of the "excessive delay" scenario. Convicted on April 9, 1981, ap-
pellant Johnson was forced to wait until August 29, 1983 for the filing of
his trial transcript. The Government gave no objective reason for the delay,
and Johnson and his attorney had made reasonable efforts to expedite the
process.
Among the circuits a basic agreement exists that release from custody
generally is an inappropriately extreme remedy in a case of excessive delay.
On appeal, one is not faced with prejudice through loss of testimony or other
evidence, as may be the case when trial is delayed. Nevertheless, fashioning
a proper remedy is no simple task. Indeed, a comprehensive fine tuning, if
not an outright overhaul, of the entire transcript process stands as a possible
response in a circuit in which delay threatens to undercut the efficient func-
tioning of the appellate process. At this juncture, it appears that aggressive
measures will likely be necessary, lest the issue of transcript delay become
an even more prevalent and compelling one in this circuit's caseload.
Turning to the past year's developments in substantive areas of the law,
the area of civil rights emerges as an especially active one, as does the area
of charges of judicial misconduct.3 At least five separate appeals since October
1982, cutting across both civil and criminal lines, have dealt to a substantial
extent with the issue of asserted judicial misconduct at the trial level. Writing
for a unanimous panel in United States v. Parodi,4 Judge Donald Russell out-
lined the proper parameters of the trial judge's role vis-a-vis the parties and
the jury. Emphasizing that it is necessary to consider the entire trial record
when attempting to determine precisely when those bounds may have been
overstepped, the court observed that a district judge need not act as a mere
"umpire or . . .a moderator at a town meeting. . . . [I]t is his duty to see
that a case on trial is presented in such a way as to be understood by the
jury, as well as by himself. ' 5 In fulfillment of that duty, judicial intervention in
the form of appropriate questioning may be entirely permissible, so long as
2. 732 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1984).
3. See generally N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT, 199-205 (1973) (of-
fering brief description of "forms of judicial misbehavior"); Gautier, Judicial Discretion to In-
tervene in the Course of Trial, 23 Cane. L.Q. 88 (1980) (surveying situations in which judicial
examination of trial participants was recognized as departure from acceptable procedure).
4. 703 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1983).
5. Id. at 775, quoting Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 694 (1941).
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the judge remains mindful of his "position of preeminence and special per-
suasiveness" in the eyes of the jury. Viewing the questions posed by the trial
judge in Parodi against the background of the entire panorama of courtroom
exchanges, this court found the presiding judge to have represented a "model
of impartiality" and patience in the face of sometimes considerable provocation.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Anderson v. Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary,6 presented a case in which the state trial judge's "emphatic, one-
sided" comments, and his pressuring of two key defense witnesses to change
their stories, were found to have denied appellant of his sixth amendment
right to present testimony, and likely to have intimidated and stifled defense
counsel. Affirming the district court's grant of habeas corpus, the circuit held
that the trial judge "so dominated the jury's impressions" by his impermissible
comments regarding witness credibility that appellant had likewise been deprived
of his fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial. Acknowledging that the rules
governing judicial comment "do not by themselves determine the due process
parameters of fairness," a six to four majority of the court fixed its own
parameters at the line of "blatant interference" with or "clear infringement"
upon the jury's function.
Between the extremes of Parodi and Anderson lie three other cases touching
upon the issue of judicial misconduct, each presenting various degrees of im-
propriety. In Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc. 7 the sole civil case of the group,
the trial judge had participated "to an uncommon degree" in the questioning
of witnesses, but that questioning was held not to have deprived plaintiff of
a fair and impartial trial. Nonetheless, the case still was remanded for a new
trial since the judge had abused his discretion by limiting the scope of expert
testimony and by refusing requested jury instructions.
A determination of precisely when judicial comment has deprived a party
of a fair trial is no easy task, as was made particularly evident in United States
v. Tello.8 In Tello, a two-member majority determined that since the trial
judge's comments contained "no direct expression of his opinion of the
evidence or of [defendant's] credibility, and stopped short of expressing any
opinion of [defendant's] guilt," the defendant had received a fair trial. Em-
phasizing the flexibility afforded a federal judge in assisting the jury as the
ultimate trier of fact, 9 the majority conceded that, while a judge would act
improperly if his comments left the jury no option as to their ultimate deci-
sion, the instant case presented no such infraction. By contrast, the dissenting
opinion, proceeding from a detailed reading of the record below, did perceive
a denial of a fair and impartial trial through the trial judge's use of "per-
jorative adjectives" evidencing a "marked disbelief" of and "distaste" for
6. 696 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
7. 705 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1983).
8. 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1982).
9. Contrast the restrictions in many state courts that prohibit a trial judge from comment-
ing on the evidence. See generally I J. VEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE, 107[01]
(1982) (categorizing states from those having "completely restricted" power of trial judge to com-
ment or summarize, to those granting "considerable leeway" for comment and summary).
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the defendant's story," The case thus highlights the fact that much room for
disagreement exists when demarcating proper from improper judicial com-
ment, a task made all the more difficult by the necessity of reviewing the often
rapidly unfolding, pressure-packed exchanges of a jury trial.
Finally, United States v. Billups'I offered a procedural reminder to counsel
that under Federal Rule of Evidence 614(c), all objections to the court's inter-
rogation of witnesses are to be made "at the time [of interrogation] or at
the next available opportunity when the jury is not present." Because appellant
in Billups failed to make such a timely objection, thereby foreclosing a con-
temporaneous correction of the perceived error, he was deemed to have waived
any objection on appeal. Moreover, the judge's curative instructions were deter-
mined to have lessened the possibility of any prejudicial effect. Thus, mere
"improvidence" on the part of a trial judge in questioning witnesses will not,
in and of itself, merit reversal, and counsel is well advised to lodge his objec-
tions at an early stage, lest waiver preclude appellate review.
In the area of civil rights, the circuit had cause in several instances to
construe the rights of prisoners under both section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code and federal habeas corpus, section 2254 of Title 28 of
the United States Code. An important procedural enhancement of prisoners'
rights was the initial result at the panel level of Shah v. Hutto, 2 in which
the court reaffirmed its decision in Craig v. Garrison,3 that "when a pro se
litigant files a notice of appeal that is untimely but within the period [of ex-
tension under Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)], the litigant must be informed
of the rule and provided an opportunity to establish excusable neglect." The
panel determined that the Advisory Committee's admonition that rules 3 and
4 be construed in a liberal manner was still a valid one, even after a 1979
amendment to rule 4, and that flexibility was especially appropriate to avoid
unjust and unwarranted exclusion of litigants from judicial relief intended by
the rules to be available to them. However, the flexible approach of the panel
was held inappropriate in an en banc opinion that emphasized the restrictive
intent of the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a). 4 By expressly requiring the filing
of a motion to obtain an extension of time, the amendment would not permit
that a bare notice of appeal be liberally construed as a proper motion for
extension, notwithstanding the pro se status of the would-be appellant. The
circuit thus abandoned the rationale of Craig, and joined the more restrictive
approach of other courts of appeal."
10. 707 F.2d at 90 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
11. 692 F.2d 320 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 84 (1982).
12. 704 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1983).
13. 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977).
14. 722 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
15. See Ryals v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1981) (since 1979 amendment to rule 4(a),
Fifth Circuit has held "tight rein" on timely-filed requirement); Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d
333 (9th Cir. 1981) (despite awareness that appellant was proceeding in propria persona, Ninth
Circuit still holds that 30-day limit of rule 4(a) is "mandatory and jurisdictional"); Mayfield
v. United States Parole Commission, 647 F.2d 1053 (10th Cir. 1981) (district court should advise
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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The potential scope of recovery under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code was likewise abridged to a degree in Ward v. Johnson.'" In Ward
the circuit held that the chairman of a Virginia prison adjustment committee
enjoyed absolute immunity from damages for his action in excluding three
witnesses from a disciplinary hearing.' 7 Originally charged with a "Major Viola-
tion" under Virginia Department of Corrections Guidelines, inmate Ward ob-
jected to defendant Johnson's exclusion of live witness testimony as irrelevant
and cumulative. Characterizing the role of an Adjustment Committee Chair-
man as "functionally comparable" to that of a judge,' 8 the majority found
that because the Virginia disciplinary proceedings possessed the sufficient
safeguards of a formal administrative adjudication, Johnson's claim of im-
munity fell squarely within the criteria for absolute immunity. That finding
rested to a large extent on a critical policy consideration: "if absolute im-
munity [were] denied in this case, the members of the Adjustment Committee
involved in prisoner disciplinary hearings... will be subjected to a real threat
of burdensome and expensive litigation, much of it in 'retaliatory response'
to the decisions of the Committee."' 9
Nonetheless, the majority still recognized that determining the proper scope
of immunity required a detailed consideration of the facts of each case, with
reference to the particular procedure under which the disciplinary hearing is
held. Thus, a nonadversarial, informal procedure would be unlikely to trigger
absolute immunity for institutional participants. While Ward is not controll-
ing beyond the scope of the Virginia regulations themselves, the case does
reflect a willingness on the part of a majority of the circuit to expand the
coverage of absolute immunity by employing a broadly flexible interpretation
of Supreme Court guidance in Butz.
Ross v. Reed"0 and Carrier v. Hutto" both construed the "cause and prej-
udice" exception to the requirement of contemporaneous objection in the
federal habeas corpus context. " In Ross, a writ of habeas Corpus was granted
pro se appellant that appeal is untimely, thereby giving notice that further action is required
to secure appellate jurisdiction). The Tenth Circuit, however, held that the mere untimely filing
of a notice of appeal in district court is not tantamount to requesting a 30-day extension and decided
that a timely motion seeking determination of excusable neglect is required to obtain a 30-day
extension.
16. 690 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
17. Id. at 1108-09. In dissent, Judges Winter and Ervin emphasized that "where immunity
is accorded to executive officials, qualified immunity is the rule and absolute immunity the rare
exception," and would not grant absolute immunity on the instant facts. Id. at 1114. Judges
Phillips and Murnaghan also would have based the decision solely on qualified immunity grounds.
Id. at 1117.
18. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (broadening coverage of absolute immun-
ity to include members of executive branch involved in performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
function).
19. 690 F.2d at 1108.
20. 704 F.2d 705 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 523 (1983).
21. 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, May 22, 1984.
22. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (vhen procedural default bars state litigation
19841
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upon a finding that the defendant had been unfairly required in his March
1969 trial to shoulder the burden or proving self-defense, in violation of the
later Supreme Court holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur. 3 The state conceded that
the "prejudice" prong was satisfied by the improper burden shift, and the
court went on to determine that there was ample cause for the defendant's
having failed to raise his objection below. Distinguishing Ross from the later
Engle decision, Judge Haynsworth wrote for a unanimous panel that, since
the conviction in Ross predated any clear articulation by the Supreme Court
regarding the proper allocation of burden of proof in self-defense cases, "the
question was novel and . ..counsel had no reasonable basis for asserting
the constitutional claim on appeal .... -124 While acknowledging that the state
has a substantial interest in discouraging procedural defaults during appellate
proceedings, the court emphasized that defense counsel could not be expected
to possess "extraordinary vision," and, indeed, should not be encouraged to
dilute meritorious claims with frivolous ones by raising and arguing every con-
ceivable constitutional claim, no matter how far-fetched.
The potential for successful pursuit of habeas relief was likewise bolstered
by the panel decision in Carrier, in which a two to one majority held that under
certain circumstances, attorney error that is insufficient to support a finding
of a full-blown violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel may still con-
stitute "cause" under the "cause and prejudice" standard. In Carrier, the
trial judge had refused the requests of an accused rapist that he be allowed
to discover certain written statements made by the victim. Inexplicably, defense
counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal. Refusing to penalize a habeas peti-
tioner for a "momentary lapse by counsel," the panel held that "attorney
error short of wholesale ineffectiveness of counsel can constitute... cause,
provided that the act or omission resulting in procedural default emanated
from ignorance or inadvertance, rather than deliberate strategy." Authoring
a spirited dissent, Judge Kenneth K. Hall characterized counsel's failure in
Carrier to lodge the contemporaneous objection as evidencing a "great
likelihood that this was a tactical decision." Thus, while the panel opinion
in Carrier opens the door a crack to habeas relief on grounds of attorney
error, petitioners should remain aware that scrutiny for true error, as opposed
to savvy tactical maneuvering, may well be strict.
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel likewise arose in the appeal
of constitutional claim, state prisoner may not obtain habeas absent showing of cause and actual
prejudice; "cause and prejudice" requires greater showing than that required to establish "plain
error" on direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (habeas petitioner must
show "cause" excusing procedural default and "actual prejudice" resulting from errors of which
he complains); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1004 (1980) (habeas corpus relief denied when petitioner failed to observe valid state rule
requiring that objection to jury instructions be raised on direct appeal; no "cause" shown since
petitioner was not prevented from raising Mullaney issue on appeal by factors beyond his control).
23. 421 U.S. 684 (1978) (burden on prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the absence
of heat of passion or sudden provocation).
24. 704 F.2d at 709.
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of Hutchins v. Garrison,25 a death penalty case heard on an expedited basis
during the December 1983 session of the court. A unanimous panel affirmed
the District Court's denial of habeas relief, sought in part on grounds of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. Hutchins had alleged that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying a continuance when defense counsel represented that
they had had inadequate time to prepare an insanity defense. Discerning not
even a "mere possibility of prejudice" as a result of the denial, the court
emphasized its reluctance to interfere with a considered state court judgment
on grounds of constitutional defectiveness. Of course, the broader import of
the holding is that, following the lead of the Supreme Court, the circuit has
evidenced a reluctance to interfere, on farfetched grounds amounting to grasp-
ing at straws, with state imposition of the death penalty. The way thus was
paved to renewed imposition of capital punishment, as has already occurred
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Even though an eleventh-hour appeal suc-
cessfully delayed for sixty days Hutchins' scheduled execution in January 1984,
the theoretical underpinnings permitting imposition of the sanction apparently
remain a viable element of this circuit's approach.
Civil rights of employees under the Civil Rights Act of 196426 were ad-
dressed in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmonda and in Wright v. Olin Corporation." Federal Reserve
clarified the appropriate role of statistical evidence in disparate treatment cases.
Refusing to clothe statistics in an unassailable cloak of irrebuttable truth, the
court advised that the assessment of statistical evidence and its supporting
data be tempered with a pinch of judicial common sense. Thus, in disparate
treatment cases, the value of statistics is to be determined in light of the actual
disparity they reflect, the relevance of the supporting data, and other cir-
cumstances in the case tending to support or undercut the hypothesis of
discrimination. Distinguishing mere statistical significance from true legal
significance, the court emphasized the circumstantial nature of such evidence,
and reiterated that it "is always subject to rebuttal. . ".."' Thus, while statistics
remain a valid means of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
the court perceives no talismanic quality of statistics alone, but rather requires
that they be assessed in a common-sense manner.
Wright required the court to address the issue of sex discrimination aris-
ing in the novel context of an employer's "fetal'vulnerability program." Osten-
sibly to protect the unborn fetus from exposure to abortifacient agents in cer-
tain plant areas, the employer adopted a three-level job classification system,
under which fertile women were completely excluded from certain jobs. Choos-
ing the disparate impact/business necessity analysis as the proper means of
resolving the case, the court held that the implementation of the fetal
25. 724 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1984).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000c-2(a) (1981) et seq.
27. 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983).
28. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
29. 698 F.2d at 646.
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vulnerability program established as a matter of law a prima facie violation
of Title VII. Aware of the inherent tension between the desire to protect the
unborn and the congressional intent to eliminate adverse impact upon women
in the workplace, the court held that in appropriate cases, business necessity
may allow an employer to impose otherwise impermissible restrictions on
employment opportunity in order to protect the unborn. The case thus
represents an interesting interface of competing and compelling concerns (the
economic welfare of women and the health of future generations), with the
court assuming the difficult role of policy maker in a complex area of legal,
social, and economic import.
Turning to the wonderful world of diversity litigation where federal judges
may reassert their natural affinity for the common law, an affinity which often
occupied their early days at the bar, we call attention to Caspary v. Louisiana
Land and Exploration Company." The issue in Caspary was whether a 1908
statute, requiring a five-percent stockholding to permit access to the stock
ledger or stockholder list, itself triggered a revitalization of a common law
rule allowing a stockholder access, even if he held but a single share, so long
as he could show a proper purpose. The common law rule lay dormant, if
indeed it were not extinguished, for forty years, while an 1868 Maryland law
gave the right of inspection to any stockholder unless the corporation could
shoulder the burden of demonstrating an improper purpose. In Caspary, in
a two to one decision, the five-percent requirement prevailed although the
shareholder established a proper purpose. Nevertheless, the case bears witness
to the fact that, in an appropriate set of circumstances, what was the law,
even though out of force for a time, may without statutory enactment or court
decision spontaneously reassert itself.
Another diversity case, this one involving the common law of South
Carolina, was Livernois v. Warner-Lambert Company, Inc. 31 an example of
a rarity in the law: one result seemed clearly indicated, in terms of overall
fairness, but neither party advanced arguments in favor of that correct result.
Warner-Lambert, the employer, sought to hunch in one direction, while Liver-
nois and his colleagues tried to go too far in the other. A division of the com-
pany had been sold as a going concern, subject to the requirement of con-
tinuation of employees by Wamer-Lambert's successor on terms that were
at least as favorable as those theretofore obtaining. Livernois and others
demanded severance pay, although they lost not a day's work as a consequence
of the corporate spinoff. Warner-Lambert contended that it escaped all liability
in the way of future severance pay if, for example, the successor, less well
financed and perhaps less adept than Warner-Lambert, should fail. Since the
solution advanced by neither party was appropriate, the court itself attempted
to reach the middle ground, the golden mean, although that solution had gone
entirely unmentioned in the District Court. The result was achieved by inter-
preting Warner-Lambert's severance pay policy as requiring it to remain liable
30. 707 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1983).
31. 723 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1983).
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for any future severance pay liabilities, should they not in fact be met by the
successor corporation.
As interesting as the foregoing determinations of state rules of law in diver-
sity cases is our failure to take decision in another case, Martin v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc. 32 The unresolved issue of North Carolina jurisprudence was
whether, when an automobile containing a hidden defect was involved in an
accident with a negligent driver of another vehicle, recovery could be had
against the manufacturer for injuries attributable to the hidden defect, or
whether the negligent driver alone was responsible. In an earlier case, Wilson
v. Ford Motor Company,33 the court had ruled that, as the originator of the
chain of events leading to the injury of the plaintiff's decedent, only the
negligent driver could be held liable. Applying strict precedent and declining
to rehear en banc, the court applied the doctrine of Wilson to preclude recovery
against the manufacturer. A dissent suggested that the earlier assessment of
North Carolina law was in error, and asserted a responsibility on the part
of the court to overrule a mistaken prior holding as to state law.
Finally, in the bankruptcy realm, Maryland National Bank v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore3 required the court to determine the proper status
of state and local tax liens on real property owned by a debtor in a Chapter
XI reorganization that was subsequently converted to a Chapter VII liquida-
tion. Emphasizing that section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code31 preserves an
interest holder's opportunity to perfect under any generally applicable law
against an entity that acquired its rights before perfection, the court ruled
that the City of Baltimore and State of Maryland retained, under Maryland
statutory authority, the right to require first application of any sale proceeds
to real taxes due and payable. This result would obtain if distribution of the
proceeds should occur only after the lien for taxes has been perfected. The
right to application of sale proceeds already exists at the moment a competing
interest in the real property arises. All parties agreed that, absent bankruptcy,
upon foreclosure taxes for which a lien had arisen before distribution of pro-
ceeds would have to be paid prior to satisfaction of the mortgagee's lien, even
though placing of the mortgage and foreclosure as well had taken place before
the tax lien ripened.
32. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
33. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
34. 723 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1983).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982).
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